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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
TO~I

XORTHERK,
Plaint iff and R eSJJO 11d c nt)

Case No.
7973

YS.

GEXERAL ~IOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIYISION,
Defendant und Apju:llant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

~TATE~IENT

A.

OF FACTS

PRELil\IINARY NTATEMENT

Plaintiff and respondent, Tom N" oTthern, will be
n·f<·JTP<l to thToughout this brief as plaintiff; defendant
and appellant, General :Jfotors Corporation, Chevrolet
DiYision, will hE' referred to throughout this brief as
defendant .
.\ll italics are ours.
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B.

THE FACTS

The statement of facts contained Ill the brief of
defendant seems to be fairly accurate. There are anumber of omissions and smne n1atters which will be corrected, but since plaintiff's brief will be primarily a
discussion of the evidence, a restatement of the facts will
not be made at this point.
The Statement of Points contained on pages :21 and
:22 of the brief of defendant shows that the material portion of the appeal of defendant is concerned only with
the proposition of whether or not the evidence was sufficient as matter of law to sustain the verdict of the jury
in plaintiff's favor. There are two statement of point~
which do not go directly to this proposition. They concern the matter of whether or not two witnesses were
qualified to express the opinions which they expressed in
their testimony. Plaintiff will, therefore, discn8~ in thi~
brief in answer to the first four points set forth in
defendant's Statement of Points, one point which i~ as
follows: The evidence sufficiently supports the finding
of the jury that defendant was negligent and that it~
negligence caused plaintiff's injuries.
STATE.MENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
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POINT II.
WITNESSES WERTSDERFER AND SYNDER WERE
QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS OPINIONS CONCERNING OBSERVATIONS MADE AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE
FINDING OF THE JURY THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT ITS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S IN JURIES.

The logical propositions which confront the court
seem to divide themselves into four distinct and separate
categories. The first category which plaintiff will disen:-:- concerns the evidence of what happened at Sacramento Pass when plaintiff sustained his injuries.
(a) The Steering Mechanism Broke While tbe Truck
was on the Surface of the Highway.

In discussing the question of what occurred at Sacramento Pa:-;s, the eourt, the jury and all parties must turn
to the e~'ewitness eYidence of the plaintiff, Tom
Northern. No one else witnessed the accident which
caused plaintiff's injuries.
Plaintiff's evidence is clear, unequivocal and undisputed. On his di reet examination he stated as follows
eoJH·Prning what happened (R. 89, 90) :
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"Q. vVhen you left the Sacrmnento Pa:'s tell
us what you did, where you went on the road, and
what happened~
"A. After we put water in the truck I pulled
out first and went down about a mile or a mile
and three quarters, son1ewheres in there.
"Q.

\Yhat speed were you making?

.. A. Started off from stop still. I imagine
I was travelling around 50 and near 60; went on
down around a curve, then the first thing I
knowed I \Yas in the middle of the road from the ·
right side; and I turned my truck back onto the
right side again, and when I went to turn it again,
u.:hich the steering wheel had completely turned
plumb around and the truck went on about its
business.
"Q. Did you hit any bumps, or had any jolts
in the front end of that car before the steering
wheel cmne loose in your hand and turned~

ue!
lllO

"A.
1ny

After the steering wheel came loose in

hand~

time~

"Q.

Before that

"A.

Before that, no, sir.

"Q. l\Ir. Northern, had there been any kind
of ruts or obstructions in the road from Sacramento Pass down to the point where the steering
wheel came loose in your hand~
"A. Only one, and that was on II igll\ra~· X o.
6, the main road, rough road, graveled state road,
is all.
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"(~. Fr01n the top of ~aeramento Pass down
to where the steering wheel came loose in your
hand had there been any rough or obstructions of
any kind'?
''~-\..

No,

~ir.

"Q. \Yill you tell us then what happened
after the steering wheel came loose in your hand?
"A. Only thing I could say about that, when
it came loose it shocked me; I reached for my wife,
and the next thing I knowed of the steering wheel
was in 1ny face.

""Q. vVhere were you when the steering
wheel was in your face~
•• A.

God only knows."

There were several attempts Inade by counsel for
defendant to confuse, mislead and put into plaintiff's
mouth words of a contradictory nature, but the quoted
portion of his evidence stands uncontradicted by any
evidence. The jury would be required to believe plaintiff; find that the steering wheel on his truck came loose
in his hand before the truck tipped over and before it
<·ame into collision with any object along the side of the
high,vay, and while he was operating the truck down a
slight grade on a usual and ordinary stretch of highway.
The quoted testimony is substantial evidence of those
fad~. Even if it were not corroborated by any additional
immutable or physical proof it would justjfy a finding
in aeeordance with the testimony. In addition to plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tiff's testimony photographs were introduced in evidence
"·hich :'hmY beyond dispute that the steering wheel had
broken and the front wheels were operating free from
the control of the driver. The photographs showing the
tire mark-s are Exhibits "C", ":J[" and "N".
The various measurements concerning the distance
between the sets of marks shown by the exhibits indicate
the impossibility for the driver of a vehicle to have
turned the wheels of the truck with sufficient speed to
cause the tire marks shown by the exhibits. Even witness
Harris, defendant's own expert, testified that in his
opinion the tire marks shown by the exhibits could not
have been 1nade voluntarily by a person driving the
truck, and that the tire marks could haYe been made hy
the wheels after they had broken loose from the steering
Inechanism (R. 408, 409). The oral testimony of plaintiff is thus corroborated and proven beyond possible controversion by the exhibits showing the tire marks on the
surface of the highway.
In addition to the recited facts, the occurrence of
the accident itself indicates that there was some interference with the driver's control of the truck. There was
no traffic; the highway was smooth; the highway was
fairly straight, and nothing on its surface interfen·d with
the way in which the truck could be controlled. Yt>t,
suddenly there appeared on the surface of the highway
tire marks, shown by the exhibits, and the truck swen·ed
off of the highway and tipperl over in the horrow pit.
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The happening of this accident is further evidence of the
truth of plaintiff's testin10ny and of the fact that son1e
portion of the truck becan1e inoperative causing a loss
of control by the driver.
The evidence is substantial, undisputed and corroborated and plaintiff submits that it forn1s a sound evidentiary basis for a jury finding that the Pitman shaft
on the steering mechanism broke while plaintiff was
dri,~ing his truck down the highway in a usual and ordinary 1nanner.
(b) The Truck Became Uncontrollable Because the
Pitman Shaft Broke.

The evidence was clear, undisputed and unequivocal
concerning the portion of the truck's steering mechanism
which failed to operate and which resulted in the truck
being uncontrollable by the driver.
\Vitnesses \Vertsderfer and Snyder, \Vho were both
nmchinists of n1any years of experience, examined plaintiff::-; truck at the scene of the accident and before it had
been moved and both stated that the only portion of the
steering mechanism which they discovered to be broken
wa:-: the Pitinan shaft.
Renold 0. Jenson, the purchaser of plaintiff's
wreeked truck and an auto body repainnan, testified that
the onl~· portion of the front end of the truck which was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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damaged \\·as the Pitman shaft and arn1 and that the two
front wheeb, the drag link and the tension bar were all
in place; were not dmnaged and were not broken ( R. ~06,
:207). The effect of this testimony was that the only thing
in the steering mechanism which ''"as not in an operable
condition was the Pitman shaft.
Apparently defendant would, hy its brief, attempt
to cast some doubt on the proposition that the Pitman
shaft broke and the loss of control of the truck resulted.
The speculation thus attempted finds no support whatever in the evidence introduced. \Vhen this evidence is
considered with the evidence recited in Point I, subparagraph (a) it appears that the jury was confronted
with unequivocal and uncontradicted evidence of two
facts: that the truck became uncontrollable while being
operated down the surface of the highway, and that the
only cause of loss of control was the broken Pitman ~haft.
The proof of these two facts plaintiff submits would have
justified the submission of his case to the jury, for a
jury could have found from the evidence that under normal operation the Pitman shaft had broken and therefore
it must not have been reasonably suited or suffieient
for the purpose for which it was intended, manufactured
and designed and that defendant was negligent in so
equipping the Chevrolet truck which it had sold to
defendant. Defendant went further than the bare mininlum in his proof and offered substantial uncontradieted
and unequivocal evidence as to the defect in the manufacture of the Pitman shaft.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(c) The Pitman Shaft Broke Because of a Defect.

The Pitman shaft that was broken was of the highest
quality steel. The evidence of the defendant, as well as
a portion of the evidence of plaintiff, demonstrated
beyond dispute that it was a high quality chrome steel,
designed to resist great and enormous pressures, stresses
and strains. The expert witness, on whom defendant as
well as plaintiff placed great reliance, that is, Dr. Earl
R. Parker, testified that in his opinion the shaft was of
such strength that a driver could not by exertion and
pressure on the steering wheel break the shaft as it was
broken (R. 296). Dr. Parker was also of the opinion that
the force breaking the Pitman shaft moved from the back
toward the front of the truck, which would not be the
result had the Pitman shaft been broken by a blow while
the truck was 1noving forward (R. 294).
The witnesses for the defendant all agreed with Dr.
Parker's opinion that the force required to break the
shaft greatly exceeded the ainount that a driver could
bring to bear by turning the steering wheel.
From this evidence plaintiff submits that the jury
<'ould find that the driver of the truck by manipulating
the ~teering wheel could not have broken the Pitman
shaft and that therefore the shaft must have been broken
at a time prior to the placing of it on the Chevrolet
truck.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This conclusion is further s'ubstantiated by the evidence of Jenson, the auto body man. Jenson testified
that there were stops which prevent the wheels of the
truck frmn turning beyond a certain torque and that
these stops operate independent of the steering meel1anisn1 and operate on each individual wheel so that when
the wheel is back against the stop no amount of force
applied on it could exert further force into the steering
mechanis1n (R. 208).
Plaintiff submits that the evidence of Parker and
Jenson completely destroys any possible basis for inference that the Pitman shaft was broken by the operation
of the truck or by the force of any blow which may have
been struck on the front end of the truck while it was
proceeding forward.
(d) The Pitman Shaft was Broken Before it was
Assembled on the Truck.

Plaintiff presented evidence showing that the break
In the Pitman shaft was in existence before the truck
wa~ assembled and left the hands of the defendant manufacturing company. Defendant's own witnP~~ Griffin
te~tified that the Pitman shaft was manufactured by a
diYision of General Motors Corporation and that thP
a~:-:embling of the Pitman shaft on the ClwvrolPt truek
was accomplished by the Chevrolet Division of the
defendant corporation. A part of the assembling of the
truck included the placing over the point where the Pitman f'haft broke a sleeve or bushing, whic·h sleeYP reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tained oil between its inside surface and the surface of
the Pihnan shaft; the oil would prevent rusting on the
Pitman shaft as long as the bushing was in place (Testimony Jenson, R. :207, 208).
Plaintiff presented evidence that the broken portions of the Pitman shaft contained on the face of the
broken surface a rust spot. This condition existed
immediately following the accident while plaintiff's
truck was still in position on the edge of the highway.
The witnesses \V ertsderfer and Synder examined
the broken Pitman shaft and both were men whose lives
had been spent handling metals, welding them, exmnining their surfaces and who were certainly qualified to
know rust or oxidation on metal when they saw it. The
testimony of Snyder and Wertsderfer was unequivocal
that a portion of the surface was oxidized and had a
slight rust film on it. Wertsderfer pointed out the rust
film to his wife, whose deposition was also presented
and considered by the jury.
rrhe existence of this rust spot on the broken surface
of the rnetal was one of the most hotly contested issues
in the case. The testimony of Snyder and Mr. and ~Irs.
Wertsderfer remained unto the end as a substantial basis
for a finding that the rust spot existed.
Even defendant's own witnesses were able, at the
time of trial, to observe on the surface of the broken
shaft a portion which was more oxidized than other porSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tions of the broken shaft. Dr. Parker, whose evidence
defendant adopts, pointed out to the court and jury the
superficial oxidation on a portion of the broken part
(R. 302). Witness Griffin, the expert upon whom the
defense case primarily rests, in front of the jury and at
the time of trial, was able to observe the rust on the top
of the broken portion of the Pitman shaft and this rust
occurred at the point where Mr. Griffin and the other
experts testified the break of the shaft commenced. In
discussing the rust, witness Griffin testified as follows
(R. 355):

"Q. Isn't that true- if you look at it maybe
you can see it a little better than I can, now, but
above that line there are evidences of rust, which
do not exist below that line?
"A. There appears to be rust there that
doesn't appear below the line."
He described the rust as superficial oxidation, the
same language used by Dr. Parker (R. 356).
One expert, Dr. Fianders, of the Universit~r of Utah,
could not see the rust on the face of the broken part.
It appears then that of the five expert witnesses who
testified about the broken part and examined ib faN'
four of those witnesses were able to see rust. Two of
the witnesses saw the rust immediately following the
accident. The other two saw it sometime after tlw arcident, but nevertheless were able to discern it:-; presence.
In addition to the four experts, one la~· witllt•:-;:-;, l\1 rs.
\Y ertsderfer, saw the rust at the time of the accident.
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Plaintiff sub1nits that there is substantial evidence
fr01n which the jury could find that the face of the broken
~haft was rusted iunnediately following the accident;
that the ru~t could not have accumulated while the shaft
\Yas in its bushing and under the grease film held in place
hy the bushing; that therefore the rust must have accumulated in the break prior to the assembling of the bushing
on the shaft. From these facts it would be required to
find that the part was broken before assembled and had
been broken for such a length of tirne as to permit this
accumulation of rust in the break. A further finding
would nece~~arily follow that the defendant manufactured and sold the truck purchased by plaintiff without
adequate precautions and safeguards to insure that the
steering mechanism was adequate to meet the stresses
and strains of normal use and that the failure to so
equip was negligence on the part of defendant.
No evidence was presented by the defendant as to
any inspections of the part in question after it was
umc;hined and assembled and before it was placed on 'the
truck. Therefore, there is no affirmative proof which
would overbalance the required findings from the recited
evidence.
Plaintiff submits that the evidence presented overwhPlmingly proves that defendant was negligent and its
negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries and
loss suffered by plaintiff.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There can be no question concerning the law of the
State of Ftah since the recent decision of Hooper r.
General J.llotors CorJJ., ______ Ptah ______ , 260 P. 2d 549. To
fit the facts of the case at bar into the framework set
forth in the Hooper opinion I will paraphrase the language of that opinion as found on page 551. Plaintiff is
required to show (1) a defective Pitman shaft at the
time of the truck assembly; (2) such defect being discoverable by reasonable inspection; (3) injury caused
hy the failure of the Pitman shaft.
Plaintiff respectfully submits that on each and every
one of the required elements of liabilit)· the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the jury's verdict and proves
hy a great preponderance the required elements set forth
in the Hooper decision.
POINT II.
WITNESSES WERTSDERFER AND SYNDER WERE
QUALIFIED TO EXPRESS OPINIONS CONCERNING OBSERVATIONS MADE AT THE SCENE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Points 5 and 6 of defendant's brief concern claimed
error in permitting witnesses Gordon Wertsderfer and
Frank Snyder to testif)- concerning their opinions and
conclusions. Both witnesses were machinists qualified
by 40 years of experience in handling-, machining, fashioning and welding metals. These witnesses were both
at the scene of the accident immediate})· following ib
oeenrence. I~ach examined the hroken Pitman shaft and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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each discovered the presence of rust thereon. Certainly
no one could seriously contend that these men were not
competent frmn their years of experience to recognize
rust when they saw it. This court has long recognized
that practical experts are witnesses whose testimony is
of great value to the jury.
In the case of Wright v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah
-!21, -!9 Pac. 309, 310, a witness for plaintiff, qualified
as a practical expert, testified concerning certain operations of a train. His testimony was objected to by the
defendant and the objection overruled. This ruling of
the trial court was the subject of the appeal and from
the opinion of this court we quote:

" * * * It appears that the witness was shown
to be competent to testify as an expert. Whether
a witness is shown to be qualified to testify as
to matters of opinion is a preliininary question
for the trial judge to pass upon at the trial, and
his discretion is conclusive unless rnanifestly
erroneous as a matter of law. Railway Co. v.
Novak, 9 C. C. A. 629, 61 Fed. 580. It also appears
that the subject about which the witness was
called upon to give his opinion was not a matter
of such common knowledge that the jury could
judge as intelligently as one skilled in the use and
management of an engine. * * *"
The question of practical expert testimony was subsequently discussed both in the majority and dissenting
opinions in the case of Graha,m v. Ogden Union Ry. &
/)('}JOt Co., 79 Utah 1, 6 P. 2d 465, 467. The majority
opinion states as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
" * * * The question as to whether the witnes~
had shown such knowledge, special skill, or experience as to entitle him to express an opinion is a
preliminary one for the court to decide before the
testimony is received, and ordinarily an appellate
court will not disturb the trial court's ruling except for a clear abuse of discretion. The rule
applicable is stated as follows:
"'Whether or not the qualification of a witness with respect to knowledge or special experience is sufficiently established is a matter resting
largely in the discretion of the trial court, whose
determination is usually final and will not be
disturbed by an appellate court except in extreme
cases where it is manifest that the trial court has
fallen into error or has abused its discretion, and
that prejudice to the complaining party has resulted, even though the appellate court might have
decided differently if the question had been presented to it in the first instance.' 22 C. J. 526.
"This rule is supported by decisions from thi~
court. Garr v. Cranney, 25 Utah, 193, 70 P. 853;
Olson v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 24 Utah, 460, 68 P. 1-1-S:
Wright v. Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah, -1-~1, -1-~l
P. 309."

A most instructive opinion concerning expert witnesses is Bratt et al v. Western Air Liues, /n('., 155 F. ~<l
850, 853. There Judge l\f urrah, after re\Tiewing the field,
stated the rule pertinent here in the following language:
" * * * There i:-; no prec·ise requirement a~ to
the mode in which requi~ite skill or experiencP
shall have been acquired. 'A witne~~ ma~T be comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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petent to testify as an expert although his knowledge was acquired through the medium of practieal experience rather than scientific study and
research.' Am. J ur., Evidence, vol. 20, Sec. 784.
"The witness had no scholastic standing in
the science of aerodynan1ics, but he was a man of
practical experience who said he had Inade an
actual study of the structural stress and strain of
the parts of an airplane, and that based upon his
examination of the wreckage at the point of the
accident and other facts available to him, he had
an opinion concerning which of the parts of the
plane structurally failed first in flight, and was
therefore the proximate cause of the accident. It
may be that his testimony was of little value when
judged by the substance of direct testimony, or
when compared with the testimony of those whose
opinions are steeped in the lore of scientific research. But, 'the law does not require the best
possible kind of a witness'. Wigmore on Evidence,
2d Ed., vol. 1, Sec. 569; Fightmaster v. Mode, 31
Ohio App. 273, 167 N.E. 407. The testimony of a
country doctor concerning the sanity of his
patient is as readily admissable as the testimony
of the most renowed psychiatrist."
In the present _case the experts were actually witnesses to the event about which they testify. The extent
of their qualification would only go to the weight of their
testimony. Both W ertsderfer and Snyder testified concerning the rust and that in their opinion the presence
of the rust indicated a flaw in the shaft. Neither
\Vertsderfer nor Snyder pretended to be experts on the
composition of the shaft and neither ventured any
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opinion that metal, of which the shaft "·as con~tructed,
not reasonably suited for that purpose. Their testimony wa~ only that the shaft, after being manufactured
and assembled, contained a fla'" "\Yhich both witnesses
,,~as

~aw.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the witne~ses
\Yertsderfer and Snyder were properly qualified and
their testimony was competent, material and relevant
to the issues for the jury to decide. No error was comInitted by the ruling of the court in permitting their
depositions to be read.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the verdict of the jur)· i~ fair:
that the eYidence presented supports the findings on
each and even· element necessary to plaee responsibility
upon the defendant for plaintiff's injuries and damage.
That this court ~hould, therefore, affi rlll the judgment
of the lower court based on the jury's verdid.
Respectfully submitted,
RA\VLIKGN, \Y..-\LLACg,
ROBERTS & BLACK

D\YIGHT L. l{INU,
Collnsel for Plaintiff a}l(l
RespondP-nf

530 .Judge Building
Salt LakE' ('it~·, Ftah
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